INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court case of Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.' has suffered from a misunderstanding. When it first issued, especially, many people took the case at face value. They assumed that Dastar meant what it said and, therefore, that it did little more than interpret the Lanham Act to exclude reverse passing off claims premised on misrepresentations about the source of uncopyrighted works. In other words, Dastar meant simply that you would not face a federal lawsuit for claiming authorship of a formerly copyrighted work that nobody now owns.
It soon became apparent, however, that Dastar meant something else altogether. Lower courts applying the case focused not on the aims that explained its holding, but rather on the specific mechanism through which the Dastar Court had tried to achieve those aims: By having stipulated that "origin" in § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act 2 does not mean the source of any idea, concept, or communication. 3 When read as a case amending § 43(a), Dastarapplies notjust to oncecopyrighted works that have fallen into the public domain, but to copyrighted, uncopyrightable, and trade secret-protected works, too. The case also applies not just to goods embodying those works, but also to services. It may well soon reach patentable subject matter, too. As judicial decisions (if not necessarily judicial opinions) have now begun to apply the case, moreover, Dastar covers both federal and state unfair competition claims. That latter move effectively doubles Dastar's already expansive application. Nobody-including, notably, the Supreme Court-seems to have predicted that Dastar would have such far-reaching effects on the law of unfair competition.
Dastar promises to have an even more surprising and extensive impact, however, on copyright law. Although courts and commentators have yet to notice it, Dastar signals a revolution in copyright law's power to preempt state laws. As with regard to the effect the case has already had on unfair competition law, it is not at all evident that the Court wanted Dastar to open new-or, more accurately, to reopen forgotten-vistas in copyright preemption. For nearly thirty years, copyright law has relied almost entirely on the preemption rules expressly set forth in § 301 (a) of the Copyright Act. 4 Now, suddenly, Dastar has revivified the long-moribund and somewhat ill-defined doctrine of implied copyright preemption.
With regard to copyright preemption even more than with regard to unfair competition, Dastar's ultimate and extraordinary consequences look likely to far outreach the Court's original, modest aims. How was the case so sorely underestimated? Because it was so sorely misunderstood. Dastar has been, in a word, misunderestimated.
I describe Dastar as misunderestimated advisedly. After President George W. Bush used that word in a number of public statements, some mocked it as an all-too characteristic slip of the tongue. 5 But U.S. presidents have a long and honored history of crafting neologisms. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, gets credit for originating over sixty words, including authentication, countervailing, doll-baby, public relations, and (less famously) vomit grass. 6 Teddy Roosevelt coined lunatic fringe and gave muckraker its current, primary meaning. 7 Why not likewise credit President Bush for a new and useful word? At all events, let us not abandon misunderestimate to the jibes of political satirists. What word better combines, in one neat bundle, the distinct but related ideas of misunderstanding and underestimation? She who misunderestimates fails both to fully comprehend her subject and, consequently, to fully predict its ramifications.' That, in a very apt word, perfectly describes how courts and commentators have interpreted Dastar.
If, notwithstanding that plea on behalf of misunderestimate, you still find it hard to take the word seriously, so much the better. The word's somewhat comical implications suit Dastar, too. Singularly peculiar facts drove the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case, facts that have yet to recur in any lower court. Nonetheless, that has not prevented lower courts from using Dastar to significantly change the scope of unfair competition and copyright law. They do not thereby take liberties with Dastar, the plain language of the case obviously supports, and arguably even mandates, its application to facts far different than those before the Supreme Court. Still, we might very well wonder whether the Supreme Court really wanted that result. It looks very much as if the Court said far more than it meant to say precisely because it aimed only to cast a moderate interpretive gloss on § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Just as legislators sometimes choose statutory language that wreaks unintended consequences, however, the Supreme Court's clarification of the Lanham Act has reshaped federal and state unfair competition law and presaged a revolution in copyright law. 7. Michael Quinion, Presidential Voices, WORLD WIDE WORDS, July 31, 2004, http:// www.worldwidewords.org/reviews/re-pre2.htm (book review).
8. So, at least, I define the word. Since so few people take the word seriously, few disagree with my definition. But see Langmaker.com, Misunderestimate (adj.), http:// www.langmaker.com/db/eng-misunderestimate.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2005) (defining the word as "[tio be excessively underestimated to the point of being ignored or ridiculed"). Since that source evidently cannot distinguish a verb from an adjective, however, it merits little regard.
Part I discusses what Dastar says by comparing the case itself with its reception in lower courts and in academic commentary. As that comparison demonstrates, Dastar has already displayed a tendency to have far greater effects than anyone at first expected. Part II explains how Dastar stands ready to surprise us yet again, this time in the area of copyright preemption doctrine. Does that prediction err by mischaracterizing the extant scope of preemption under § 301(a)? Part III carefully considers and rejects that critique. Part IV thus ventures a few predictions about what will result if, as seems likely, Dastar resurrects implied copyright preemption. The conclusion offers a brief review set amidst the customary rhetorical flourishes.
I. WHAT DASTAR AND ITS PROGENY SAY: COPYRIGHT LIMITS FEDERAL UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
This Part contrasts the meaning of Dastar with what lower courts and commentators take the case to say. As Section A describes, the Dastar Court argued from a variety of broad policy concerns to a narrow conclusion about the meaning of a single word in § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act. As Section B describes, lower courts have focused on that latter aspect of Dastar, reading the case to have effectively amended § 43(a) (1) (A) in all its applications. In so doing, lower courts have expanded Dastar's reach far beyond what the Supreme Court's policy concerns mandated or even suggested. Section C surveys what commentators have said about Dastar, revealing that they have said little about its late-breaking expansion in lower courts and nothing about the preemption issues the case raises, a topic considered in Part I of this Article.
A. Dastar Itself
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 9 the Supreme Court addressed whether § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act affords a claim against the reverse passing off of a once-copyrighted film that has fallen into the public domain. The plain language of that section puts anyone using in commerce a mark that "is likely to cause confusion ... as to the origin... of his or her goods" at risk of civil liability for unfair competition. 10 The Dastar Court held, however, that "origin" in § 43(a) (1) (A) refers solely to "the producer of the tangible product sold in the marketplace" 1 1 -not to "the person or entity that originated the ideas or communications that 'goods' embody or contain." 2 Under that interpretation of the statute, the defendant in Dastar could incur no liability under § 43(a) for having engaged in the reverse passing off-i.e., having sold under its own name-goods containing once-copyrighted works created by another party. 42 That wind-up prepared the Court for its pitch on behalf of defending the integrity of copyright policy:
Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representation of itself as the "Producer" of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43 (a) for that representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's "federal right to 'copy and to use' expired copyrights. 43 The Court then turned to other considerations from policy and precedent that, while worthy of study, do not prove especially pertinent here." The evident worry that federal unfair competition law might conflict with copyright law arguably exercised a more powerful influence on the Court than those other considerations did. The dis- As argued later in this Article, 4 7 that reasoning effectively mandates that courts preempt state law reverse passing off claims similar to the Lanham Act claim struck down in Dastar. Indeed, as argued in the next Section, courts have already begun to fulfill that mandate.
B. Dastar in the Courts
Lower courts have consciously expanded the reach of Dastar in a variety of ways. Most notably, they have read it to bar § 43(a) reverse passing off claims arising out of the unauthorized use of copyrighted works.
4 8 That expansion has won almost universal support in the case law. Lower courts have also expanded Dastar by reading it to bar reverse passing off claims arising out of the use of uncopyrightable ideas and trade secrets (rather than just uncopyrighted works) and by reading it to speak to communicative services (rather than just communicative goods)." Although those expansions have won considerably less support in the case law, they provide further evidence that Dastar has had a bigger impact than anyone-including, in all likelihood, the Supreme Court itself-initially would have predicted. Lower courts have expanded Dastar's reach in yet another, still more remarkable way: By relying on the case to preempt state law reverse passing off claims arising out of the unauthorized use of copyrighted works.
50 Surprisingly, lower courts have adopted that fourth reading of Dastar without any evident consciousness that in so doing they have opened the door to a revolution in copyright's preemption doctrine. Subsections 1 through 4 discuss, in turn, each of those four ways in which lower courts have expanded Dastais reach. Dastar court claimed to have found the proper meaning of "origin of goods" as used in § 43(a) (1) (A) of the Lanham Act, explaining that "the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods." 58 The Court did not expressly limit that reading to cases involving works of authorship in public domain. Nor could the rhetoric of Dastar have easily admitted that exception. Granted, the Court cited policy considerations and appears in fact to have been motivated by concerns that unfair competition law might conflict with copyright law. 5 9 Nonetheless, in an apparent attempt at judicial modesty, the Court hid its policy concerns behind the fig leaf of statutory interpretation.
Expanding
The Dastar Court thus effectively amended the Lanham Act, changing its meaning for any and all applications. Indeed, lower courts largely appear to have not even noticed that they have expanded Dastar to cover copyright-protected works. The exceptional court, Williams v. UMG Recordings, 6° confronted the defendants' claim that Dastar applies only to uncopyrighted works with a summary counterargument: "To the contrary, the Supreme Court's holding did not depend on whether the works were copyrighted or not."" Perhaps that goes a bit far. A fair reading of Dastar shows that the uncopyrighted status of the works at issue in the case did trigger the Court's policy concerns. Nonetheless, regardless of the reasoning behind it, lower courts quite understandably take Dastar's holding to dictate the meaning of "origin" in § 43(a) (1) (A) as a general matter, regardless of its application. law of copyright, which addresses that subject specifically"), 34 (worrying that such a cause of action would "create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the public's federal right to copy and to use, expired copyrights") (internal quotation marks omitted), 34-35 (describing the sharply limited rights in § 106A of the Copyright Act and arguing, "Recognizing in § 43(a) a cause of action for misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works (visual or otherwise) would render these limitations superfluous"), 37 (explaining that the Court's interpretive gloss aimed to prevent the Lanham Act from creating "a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do").
60. 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 61. Id. at 1185. The court did offer a bit more to the argument; the quotation continues: "Rather, in being careful not to extend trademark protections, the Court noted that protection for communicative products was available through copyright claims. In fact, this protection would only be available if a valid copyright existed." Id. The Williams court surely erred, however, in claiming that Dastar conditioned its analysis on a valid copyright subsisting, or even having subsisted, in the communicative products at issue. Rather, the Court plainly focused on whether copyright protection was available. SeeDastar, 539 U.S. at 37-38 (discussing ways the defendants could have won copyright rights).
[VOL. 65: 206 2. Expanding Dastar to Other Intellectual Properties.-Held strictly to its facts, Dastarspeaks only of the permissibility of claims against the reverse passing off of fixed works of authorship-i.e., copyrightable (if not necessarily copyrighted) intellectual property. 6 2 It has, however, been extended to bar complaints about the reverse passing off of other types of intellectual property-i.e., uncopyrightable facts and trade secrets. Judging from the plain language of the case, courts will almost certainly also soon extend Dastar to cover subject matter within the scope of patent law. This Subsection discusses each topic in turn.
a. Uncopyrightable Works.-It might at first appear unduly pedantic to claim that Dastar does not speak of uncopyrightable subject matter. The opinion does, after all, show evident concern about preserving the public domain from overbroad claims of unfair competition. 6 " But no less a personage than Judge Richard A. Posner has claimed (in a law review article rather than a judicial opinion) that Dastar applies only "in cases in which what is palmed off is expressive material." 64 To read it as applicable to uncopyrightable material more generally would, he explains, put in doubt the venerable holding of International News Service v. Associated Press, 6 5 which affirmed an injunction on (arguably) the reverse passing off of uncopyrightable facts.
6 6 Nonetheless, one or more courts have, rightly or wrongly, expanded Dastar to bar § 43(a) reverse passing off claims relating to the reuse of uncopyrightable (as opposed to uncopyrighted) works.
The "or more" hedge reflects uncertainty about the copyright status of the works at issue in two of those cases. 76 which read Dastar to bar a Lanham Act reverse passing off claim where the defendant had used a leg from one of the plaintiff's tables to prepare a sample table, which the defendant then used to win a contract for building similar tables in quantity. Was plaintiffs table leg copyrighted? Probably not. Although the Bretford court did not speak to the issue, furniture designs generally constitute useful articles not subject to copyright protection. 7 7 Also, the fact that the defendant evidently made numerous copies of the plaintiffs table leg without suffering a copyright infringement claim-but instead only a reverse passing off claimstrongly suggests that no such copyright existed. 78 At any rate, courts apparently have few qualms about extending Dasta?'s coverage from uncopyrighted works to uncopyrightable ones. Certainly, no court has yet to reject an appeal to Dastar based on that distinction. Does that expansion of (2000) (limiting the definition of copyrightable sculptural works to "their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects" and explaining that the design of any useful article will qualify as sculpture "only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article"); Collezione Europa U.S.A., Inc. v. Hillsdale House Ltd., 243 F. Supp. same policy concerns that inspired the Supreme Court's decision regarding uncopyrighted works also apply to uncopyrightable ones. Not all do, however. Note, for instance, that the Supreme Court justified its refusal to grant the Dastar plaintiffs protection from reverse copying in part because they could have availed themselves of copyright protection. 7 9 The same hardly holds true of plaintiffs asserting claims for the reverse passing off of their uncopyrightable ideas or facts. Furthermore, as Judge Posner observed, expanding Dastar to cover uncopyrightable facts threatens to bring it into conflict with wellestablished precedents upholding the misappropriation cause of action. ," l appears to have answered that question yes. Plaintiff Tao complained that defendant AS&M's winning proposal to sell engineering services to NASA incorporated Tao's trade secrets, misrepresenting AS&M's services and confusing NASA to Tao's detriment. 8 2 The Tao court dismissed the § 43(a) (1) (A) claim that plaintiff based on those allegations. 8 3 As the court explained, the plaintiff claimed that AS&M's proposal "incorporated ideas or concepts that belonged to Tao. This, however, is precisely the type of allegation which the Supreme Court rejected as the basis for a reverse-passing-off claim in Dastar. ''s4 With the Tao court's expansion of Dastar to cover trade secrets, as with other courts' expansion of Dastar to cover copyrighted works, 8 5 we see how the policy considerations that evidently drove the Dastar Court matter far less to lower courts than the Court's gloss on the language of § 43(a) (1) (A). patent law and policy. 8 6 The Court's final and most concise statement of its holding, moreover, not only expressly invokes patents; it puts them on equal footing with copyrights:
In sum, reading the phrase "origin of goods" in the Lanham Act in accordance with the Act's common-law foundations (which were not designed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which were), we conclude that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods. 8 7 It surely remains only a matter of time before some clever defendant, facing an accusation of the reverse passing off of subject matter within the scope of patent law, successfully invokes that language to dismiss the claim. That will hardly represent a breakthrough; as the Dastar opinion's review of the precedents make plain, the Court has long limited states from interfering with patent law and policy. 8 8 It will, however, represent one more example of the case's application to a form of intellectual property not before the Dastar court. 
. goods" in § 43 (a) (1) (A)
. 89 Yet that section refers not to goods alone, but to "goods, services, or commercial activities," together.° Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, courts have expanded Dastar beyond mere goods, to services and commercial activities. The court in Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., flatly rejected the plaintiff's claim that Dastar could not preempt a claim for the reverse passing off of services. 1 More than that, the Williams court audaciously countered that Dastar itself in fact concerned not goods but services, claiming that "in Dastar, the defendant did exactly what Plaintiff accuses Defendants of doing here-attributing to itself and its employees various 'services' that the plaintiffs claimed they, in fact, The short list of lower court cases applying Dastar to preempt state law reverse passing off claims begins with Dastar itself, on remand. 9 5 After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the Lanham Act claim at issue in Dastar, the defendants asked the district court to revisit the plaintiffs' state law claim and dismiss it with prejudice. 9 6 The court granted both requests. 7 As is typical for courts applying Dastar to preempt state law reverse passing off claims, the court hearing Dastar on remand failed to explain the legal basis for its decision. Instead, the court simply pronounced, "The Supreme Court's finding that Defendants' actions were not misleading under the Lanham Act controls the resolution of their California unfair competition claim." 9' Why did the Supreme Court opinion "control"? The court did not say.
That Before applying that statutory preemption provision, however, the court turned to the problem of disentangling the two theories embedded in the plaintiffs claim, "a hybrid of both traditional and reverse palming off."'' Once having solved that problem, the court returned to the question of whether the reverse passing off claim merited preemption. 
C. Dastar in the Commentary
Although Dastar has attracted a fair amount of commentary, none of it appears to hit upon the thesis set forth here. The most impassioned discussions about Dastar tend, unsurprisingly, to arise from the debate between the case's champions and its critics. Commentators on the "pro" side of Dastar tout the case as a victory for the public domain. 1 3 Commentators on the "con" side criticize Dastar for unnecessarily limiting an important means of protecting consumers from reverse passing off. 1 14 A separate, less polarized vein of commentary discusses whether Dastar's holding reflects primarily a question of how to interpret the Lanham Act"' or instead a broad inquiry , which I first discovered only some months after this paper had been accepted for publication. See also Lastowka, supra note 114, at 1213 n.211 (saying of the Dastar Court's invocation of § 1Q6A as proof that federal lawmakers meant to preclude any other protections of attribution rights, "The most plausible (and, at the same time, the most radical) reading of the conflict would ... focus on... some form of constitutional preemption .... For instance, it could conceivably affect other non-copyright schemes protecting authorship rights, including state laws concerning misappropriation and rights of publicity").
progeny actually do in practice. Ordinarily, that sort of distinction would not bear much fruit. Especially in the law (as opposed to, say, sports), words tend to equate to results. In the particular instance of Dastar and related cases, however, a telling gap has opened between what courts say and what they do. The Supreme Court said in Dastar, for instance, that it was limiting the scope of the Lanham Act. In fact, however, thanks to the functional equality of a § 43(a) reverse passing off claim and a typical state law reverse passing off claim, the Dastar Court limited both federal and state law. 11 9 Similarly, lower courts applying Dastar say (insofar as they say anything) that it bars state law reverse passing off claims simply because they traditionally treat those claims in the same way they treat federal ones. 120 Whether they realize it or not, however, those lower courts have launched a revolution in copyright preemption doctrine. Section A shows that Dastar has preempted state reverse passing off claims, whereas Section B explains how Dastar does so. Section C, briefly touching on a different aspect of Dastar, argues that the case has put teeth back into the Copyright Clause's "limited times" provision.
A. Copyright Preempts State Unfair Competition Law
Courts applying Dastar have already demonstrated that the case has the power to stop a state law reverse passing off claim dead in its tracks. 121 
B. Direct Supremacy Clause Preemption, Rediscovered
The U.S. Constitution provides that it and the laws made under it "shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." ' 29 The
Constitution also expressly empowers federal lawmakers to pass legislation creating and protecting copyright rights.
3
The Constitution's Supremacy Clause thus provides the ultimate justification for copyright's preemption of state laws, no matter what guise that preemption takes. Dastar does not change that. The case does, however, herald a shift in the type of copyright preemption that courts favor, away from the express preemption of § 301(a) and toward the more general principles of implied preemption applied in Dastar. Because different sorts of preemption have different effects, moreover, that doctrinal shift promises to broaden the scope of copyright preemption.
Courts have enforced the Supremacy Clause by way of three different types of preemption: field preemption, express preemption, and implied preemption. 1 3 ' Field preemption arises when "Congress has intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field of regulation and has thereby 'left no room for the States to supplement ' , at 1-8 ("Congress has acted in explicit terms to pre-empt various state laws through Section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976."); Rothman, supra note 131, at 237 (claiming that express preemption "clearly exists in copyright law because of the Section 301 preemption clause contained within the Copyright Act"). But see Lemley, supra note 131, at 139 (applying the "field" label to § 301 (a) preemption).
137. For a description of § 301 (a)'s operation, as well as a small sample of the many, many cases employing that provision in questions of preemption, see infra Part III.
138. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 133, § 1.01 [B] , at 1-8 (stating that because of § 301 (a), "courts usually need not gauge whether the federal interest in this field is dominant, whether the field of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to raise an inference of intent to pre-empt, or whether any of the other pre-emption tests apply; rather, in general the courts may simply turn to the explicit statutory language") (footnotes omitted).
139. See id. (describing copyright preemption prior to the 1976 act). 140. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980) (affirming summary judgment against a common-law unfair competition claim based on defendants' use of facts on grounds that, under Sears and Compco, "states are pre-empted from removing such material from the public domain"); Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Sports nor have many cases done so since. Section 301 (a) did not take over copyright preemption doctrine immediately, of course. In the span before that legislative innovation had seen much judicial interpretation, courts sometimes bolstered their preemption analyses by drawing on old case law that had of necessity relied on the Supremacy Clause alone.' 4 1 But that shows little more than an understandable preference for familiar precedents-not that implied copyright preemption enjoyed a robust coexistence with express preemption under § 301(a). After § 301 (a) rose to dominate copyright preemption doctrine, courts relied on implied preemption only in those particular and somewhat rare cases where a state regulatory scheme targeting rights and remedies under the Copyright Act was at stake. 14 2 Or, more accurately, courts arguably relied on implied preemption in those cases. The case of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd. 14 3 offers a characteristically ambiguous example of the genre. The court there held a Louisiana statute regulating software licenses preempted without evidently relying on § 301 (a).' 4 4 Neither, however, did the court disparage that section's relevance. And, notably, the lower court in Vault had resolved the preemption issue by citing both § 301 and the implied preemption doctrine expressed in the Supreme Court's Sears and Compco cases.' 4 5 Given its relatively quick discussion of the preemption issue, the court of appeals might well have simply neglected to cite the former source of preemption law. 142. As Paul Goldstein explains, "State regulatory programs do not fit comfortably within the design of section 301. To varying degrees, these programs do affect copyright subject matter. But none creates a right equivalent to copyright." 3 PAUL GOLDSTEIN offers a clear example of implied copyright preemption during the reign of § 301(a). That case concerned a New York state law requiring performing arts societies to give notice before investigating a party suspected of violating the copyrights of the societies' members and imposing sanctions on the societies if they failed to give the suspect the required notice.' 5° The Pataki court found that statute preempted without making any reference to § 301 (a). It instead relied on Cuomo and an old implied preemption precedent 1 5 1 to conclude, "Because the provisions impose a notice requirement on copyright enforcers, and make non-compliance with the requirement actionable, the provisions hinder the realization of the federal copyright scheme." 152 Even supposing that those cases show implied preemption survived in one small corner of copyright law, they hardly show the doctrine thriving after the enactment of § 301(a). At a minimum, it seems fair to say that for many years § 301 (a) almost wholly crushed any interest in resolving copyright preemption questions by way of direct appeal to the Supremacy Clause. Furthermore, courts considering the sorts of generic common-law or statutory claims typically responsible for triggering preemption inquiries-claims of unfair competition, misappropriation, conversion, breach of contract, or so forth-have long shown absolutely no interest in stepping outside the bounds of § 301 (a). So copyright preemption appeared, at any rate, prior to Dastar. Seen against that background, Dastar's impact on copyright preemption jumps forth. After nearly thirty years under the hegemony of § 301 (a), and thanks solely to Dastar's liberating effect, courts have begun to revisit the fundamentals of copyright preemption. Intentionally or not, Dastar has freed lower courts to go beyond the strictures of § 301 (a) and to make a direct appeal to the Supremacy Clause in questioning whether a state law cause of action conflicts with the Copyright Act.' 5 3 As discussed below, 1 54 that stands to reshape the future of copyright preemption.
C. Teeth Given to "Limited Times"
Dastar teaches us that the Copyright Clause's "limited times" provision has real bite in preempting some state law claims. Which ones? Those that risk giving indefinite protection to works within the scope of federal copyright law. Dastar's rule applies regardless of whether preempted state law claims require more elements than a copyright law claim would and, according to lower courts' broad interpretations of Dastar, regardless of whether or not those state protections have in fact begun to outlive copyright ones. It suffices, in light of Dastar, that a state law risks limiting public use of fixed works of authorship for a period exceeding the limits imposed by federal copyright law.
The preemptive powers released in Dastar arise directly from the Supremacy Clause, independent of § 301 of the Copyright Act. That marks something of an innovation in copyright jurisprudence, which since the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act has relied almost entirely on § 301's codification of copyright preemption. But it should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with patent preemption. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution's Patent Clause and Supremacy Clause can preempt conflicting state laws directly, without the help of any federal legislation. 155 Patent preemption could happen no other way, given that the Patent Act' 5 6 has no counterpart to the Copyright Act's § 301. Recognizing that the Constitution's Copyright and Supremacy Clauses combine to preempt conflicting state laws directly, without the intermediation of the Copy- right Act, thus simply brings copyright law up to speed with patent law. Bonito Boats does not mandate a contrary holding. Granted, the Court in that case airily claimed "that the Patent and Copyright Clauses do not, by their own force or by negative implication, deprive the States of the power to adopt rules for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own jurisdictions."' 5 7 But both the holding and reasoning of that case indicate that the Court recognized the power of constitutional provisions alone, operating without the backing of any statutory preemption clause, to preempt conflicting state laws. The Bonito Boats Court did, after all, preempt the state boat-hull protections under review, notwithstanding the absence of any Patent Act counterpart to the preemption clause set forth in § 301 of the Copyright Act.' 5 8
Dastar thereby stands in contrast with the slightly earlier Supreme Court case of Eldred v. Ashcroft. " ' 59 Faced with a plea to strike down the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) as an unconstitutional extension of the term of copyright, the Eldred Court demurred. 6 0 Finding that the CTEA satisfied a rational basis inquiry, the Court held that "it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives." ' 6 1 But that does not quite put Dastar and Eldred into contradiction. The Eldred Court premised its holding on the fact that (as the Court regarded it) the CTEA did not create perpetual copyrights. 1 62 The Dastar Court, in contrast, found the reverse passing off claims under its review guilty of exactly that offense. "To hold otherwise would be akin to finding that § 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent and copyright, which Congress may not do," the Dastar Court concluded, citing Eldred in its defense.' 6 3 mitigate this Article's argument that Dastar has revived direct Supremacy Clause preemption of state laws that conflict with federal copyright power."' To the contrary, § 301 (a) would suffice to preempt the sorts of claims at issue in Dastar. In that event, courts could-and undoubtedly would-continue to rely solely on the Copyright Act to resolve copyright preemption issues. Direct Supremacy Clause preemption would remain a largely theoretical issue in copyright law, one unlikely to have any practical impact. As this section explains, however, no authority can convincingly assert that § 301 (a) preempts state law claims like those at issue in Dastar nor, when read closely, do many authorities actually assert as much.
III. CONSIDERATION OF THE OBJECTION THAT § 301 (A)
Section 301 (a) of the Copyright Act preempts any state law that satisfies two conditions: it creates "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106," and those rights cover "works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections such a claim requires proof that the defendant: (1) caused likely commercial harm to the plaintiff (2) by misrepresenting, (3) in a manner likely to confuse prospective consumers, (4) that the defendant was the origin of goods or services (5) in fact originating with the plaintiff. 16 9 All but the last of those elements go beyond the requirements for a copyright infringement claim.
Consider, for instance, someone who illegally duplicates copyrighted movies and sells them as admittedly unauthorized copies. Far from misrepresenting the source of those movies, the pirate trumpets the fact that he offers good but cheap copies of someone else's intellectual property.
1 70 He thus commits copyright infringement without also engaging in the reverse passing off of a communicative product. 17 1 Such a reverse passing off would require proof of different and additional elements-namely, misrepresentations likely to confuse consumers as to the origin of the movie-not required by the copyright infringement claim. Commentators thus agree that § 301 (a) should not preempt a well-pleaded claim under state law against the reverse passing off of a communicative product. 171. Strictly speaking, even if the pirate misrepresented that he was selling legal copies of the movie, he would risk liability for the direct passing off of the DVDs or videos as authentic, rather than for the reverse passing off someone else's goods or services as his own. I describe the pirate as selling admittedly unauthorized copies only because pirates sometimes do so and because it simplifies the example.
172. District courts in the Second Circuit have in recent years both followed Kregos and confirmed the implication that a well-pleaded reverse passing off claim will not suffer preemption under § 301 (a). The court in Faulkner v. National Geographic Society, for instance, held that "[p] laintiffs' common law unfair competition claim is preempted because it alleges nothing other than false designation of origin through improper use of copyright notice." 1 78 The court in Silverstein v. Penguin Putnam, Inc., in contrast, found that the plaintiff's "unfair competition claims covering reverse passing off are not preempted because those claims involve the extra element of misrepresentation or deception."' 7 9 After confirming that "unfair competition claims asserting 'reverse passing off' claims are generally not preempted by the copyright laws," the court in Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc. found the particular claims before it failed on other grounds. 1 1979) (finding preempted by § 301 (a) a claim that plaintiff characterized as "palming off"-which the court would have allowed to escape preemption-but that the court construed as a claim for reverse passing off).
183. unfair competition claims that alleged no more than "misappropriation of third-party content" and "willful infringement" of copyrights.' 9 '
Not all the decisions of district courts in the Ninth Circuit so clearly conform to the now-prevailing view that § 301 (a) will not preempt a properly pleaded reverse passing off claim. [VOL. 65: 206 failure to attribute will suffice to support a claim for the reverse passing off.'" 4 Also, the plaintiff in CD Law failed to allege that consumer confusion was likely to result. 1 " 5 The case thus did not concern a properly pleaded claim for reverse passing off, making the CD Law court's finding of § 301 (a) preemption consistent with the Ninth Circuit approach. Other, older decisions of district courts in the Ninth Circuit prove more resistant to assimilation with that now-predominating view.' 96 Because those cases date back to 1990 or earlier, however, they simply fail to reflect the Ninth Circuit's current approach to § 301 (a) preemption of Dastar-like claims raised under state law.
Courts elsewhere generally take the same approach to § 301 (a) preemption of state law reverse passing off claims. District courts in the Sixth Circuit have twice now made clear that they will permit such a claim if it comes supported by adequate pleading.' 9 7 District courts in the other circuits have implied as much by preempting reverse passing off claims under § 301 (a) expressly because those claims failed to allege the full panoply of elements that properly distinguish reverse passing off from copyright infringement. The court in CoStar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., for instance, dismissed a reverse passing off claim because the plaintiff alleged no more than "the mere act of copying,"' 19 8 thus leaving open the possibility that a claim alleging misrepresentation of authorship and likelihood of consumer confusion would survive § 301 (a) preemption. District courts in the Federal Cir-cuit have likewise held that "'a failure to attribute' is alone insufficient for a state-law claim to avoid Copyright Act preemption. " 199 A few courts, granted, appear to have read § 301(a) to preempt all state law reverse passing off claims, no matter how well pleaded. As noted above, such a reading does not conform with the plain language or received meaning of § 301 (a). 200 Nor, as the above review of the case law indicates, does that reading conform with the most authoritative, numerous, and recent judicial interpretations. 20 1 Nonetheless, some (but far from all) trial courts in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits appear to have vested § 301 (a) with unduly broad power to preempt state reverse passing off claims.
Among trial courts in the Seventh Circuit, the trend started with FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, InC.
0 2
Although the FASA court noted that some courts and commentators had concluded that § 301 (a) does not preempt state law reverse passing off claims, 20 it ultimately concluded that the reverse passing off claim under consideration lacked the additional elements necessary to distinguish the claim from one for copyright infringement. 2°4 For reasons carefully explained by Roberta Kwall, FASA suffers a somewhat dubious provenance. 205 Even so, the facts of the case do not take its holding far beyond the many cases from other jurisdictions, reviewed above, 20 6 that have disallowed inadequately pleaded state reverse passing off claims while still leaving room for claims that rely on the extra elements that distinguish reverse passing off from copyright infringement. Those courts did not issue holdings nearly so broad as their assertions, however; rather, they relied on the conventional analysis under which only inadequately pleaded reverse passing off claims suffer § 301 (a) preemption.
0 Some courts can apparently see through that rhetoric to the underlying law. 211 Unfortunately, however, the court in 301 (a) because the "extra element" of "misrepresentation leading to consumer confusion" that allegedly distinguished passing off claims from copyright claims "is present only minimally in the reverse passing off context. ' The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the latter case, albeit without expressly condoning the trial court's broad condemnation of reverse passing off claims.
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Before closing this review of case law addressing whether § 301 (a) preempts reverse passing off claims, we should keep in mind that, prior to Dastar, courts and litigants might not have thought or dared to look outside of the scope of the Copyright Act when faced with dubious state law claims. Some courts might thus have worked a bit too hard to squeeze state law reverse passing off claims within the bounds of § 301 (a) preemption. Courts need no longer resort to that legal gambit, however, because Dastar has now opened the way to direct Supremacy Clause preemption of reverse passing off claims that conflict with the ends and means of copyright law. To the plain language of § 301(a), the commentary explaining its meaning, and the overwhelming judicial authority holding that § 301 (a) does not preempt an adequately pleaded state law reverse passing off claim, courts How will Dastar shape copyright preemption doctrine in coming years? At the very least, courts considering the preemption of state reverse passing off claims will continue to seize on the case as a simpler and more authoritative alternative to § 301 (a) of the Copyright Act. Courts have already done so in several instances. It also looks likely that courts applying the broad principles of Dastar to state reverse passing off claims will, consciously or not, expand the reach of copyright preemption beyond the limits of § 301(a). That trend, too, arguably has begun. Farther into the future, after citing Dastar to preempt state reverse passing off claims has become commonplace, courts may begin applying the case to preempt other types of state law claims. In that event, Dastar will lead to the preemption of state law claims that escape the reach of § 301(a), but nonetheless impermissibly conflict with federal copyright law. This Part explains each of those predictions, in turn.
Courts will almost certainly continue the practice, already evident in the case law, 2 17 of relying on Dastar rather than § 301 (a) to resolve difficult questions about the preemption of state reverse passing off claims. Applying § 301 (a), especially its "extra element" test, poses a notoriously difficult problem, as anyone who has tried to wade through the meandering case law on § 301 (a) can vouchsafe. 2 18 Dastar offers courts an authoritative yet simple way around that problem. The Aagard opinion gives ready proof of how and why courts grappling with copyright preemption doctrine might abandon § 301 (a) for Dastar. 2 1 9 Tackling the question of whether or not to preempt a state law reverse passing off claim, the Aagard court initially framed the issue in terms of § 301 (a) .220 As detailed above, however, the court botched that attempt and, intentionally or not, abandoned § 301 (a) to resolve the matter solely in reliance on Dastar. 2 21 Other courts applying Dastar to decide state law reverse passing off claims have not even bothered citing § 301(a). 2 Future courts will not only face the same easy choice between § 301 (a) and Dastar, they will also increasingly find that they can rely on earlier courts in choosing the latter. We should thus expect to see courts habitually decide the preemption of state law reverse passing off claims by light of Dastar and its lower court progeny, rather than § 301 (a). It furthermore looks likely that, as a consequence, courts will expand copyright preemption doctrine beyond the confines of § 301(a). That statutory provision, recall, aims at barring state law rights that "are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights" afforded by copyright law. 223 The Dastar Court, in contrast, barred the unfair competition claim before it for interfering with copyright policy, not for duplicating copyright law rights.
22 4 Dastar thus offers nothing like the sort of "extra elements" inquiry that courts applying § 301 (a) routinely engage in.225 As courts increasingly turn to the Dastar line of cases, rather than to § 301 (a), in resolving preemption questions, they will decreasingly ask whether a state law claim is equivalent to, or has the same elements as, a copyright law claim. Rather, following Dastar's lead, courts will ask whether a suspect state law claim threatens to conflict with federal copyright policy.
Will that mark an improvement in copyright law or, more importantly, in intellectual property law as a whole? I doubt it. The notorious vagaries of Sears, Compco, and Bonito Boats show that implied conflicts preemption hardly offers bright prospects for the rule of law. Granted, § 301 (a) has won deserved criticism for likewise casting impenetrable shadows. But by way of their "extra element" gloss, courts eventually interpreted § 301 (a) so as to mark off broad categories of state law as plainly beyond the threat of preemption. [Voi-. 65: 206 terpreting implied conflict copyright preemption would not offer equally sharp (or, more properly, would not offer any less fuzzy) boundaries for years, at best. Such reflections lead me to conclude that the last and greatest surprise to issue from Dastar, that wildcard of a case, may well prove its most unwelcome one.
CONCLUSION
Dastar offers a wealth of surprises. What started out looking like a well intentioned, tightly reasoned, and modestly limited little case has, in only a few years, grown into an intellectual property powerhouse. On its face, Dastar merely bars federal unfair competition claims alleging the reverse passing off of goods communicating formerly copyrighted material. In application, however, Dastar has come to bar federal or state unfair competition claims that allege the reverse passing off of goods or services communicating formerly-copyrighted, stillcopyrighted, uncopyrightable, or trade secret-protected material. In brief, Dastar now negates almost any complaint that a law of the United States limits the misattribution of intellectual property.
That phenomenon alone would merit attention. But Dastar conceals yet another, related, and bigger surprise. The functional equivalence between federal and state unfair competition claims means that case's policy arguments apply to the latter as well as the former. Courts have thus quite sensibly cited Dastar as justification for barring state law reverse passing off claims. The legal differences between reverse passing off and copyright claims, however, means that Dastar cannot derive its power to preempt state reverse passing off claims from § 301 (a) of the Copyright Act. A reverse passing claim has "extra elements" that distinguish it from a copyright claim and, thus, immunize a state reverse passing off claim from express preemption under § 301 (a). Only the long-moribund and ill-defined doctrine of implied preemption can explain Dastar's power over state reverse passing off claims. That looks like Dastars most worrisome, and most misunderstimated, legacy.
The Dastar Court probably did not expect that lower courts would apply its opinion to so broad a range of unfair competition claims. Everyone, it seems, misunderestimated the case on that count. We now have a better understanding of what Dastar means. We can thus estimate that it may well soon expand from copyright to patent law. We can also foresee-and can hardly fail to overestimate-Dastar's impending collision with copyright preemption doctrine.
